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Abstract 
There is growing evidence that the impact of financial development on economic growth might be non-linear and 
hump-shaped, exhibiting a turning point. However, such findings are typically established using total finances 
(mostly: credit), and the apparent non-linear impact of totals can stem from a substantial structural change in the 
composition of finances, that has been taking place during the recent decades. Though there are some studies 
going beyond total finances, they usually look at the impact of certain financing components separately or using 
ratios, which may bias the estimation and lead to incorrect conclusions. Finally, the findings are typically based 
on a global pool of countries, and may be driven by a developing versus developed country differential.  
Focusing on groups of high-income countries (from the OECD, EU, and EMU), this study shows that the finding 
of a non-linear, hump-shaped impact of financing on economic growth is robust to controlling for financing 
composition in terms of the sources (bank credit, debt securities, stock market) and the recipients of finances 
(households, non-financial and financial corporations), or both. In particular, we obtain the following results. (1) 
The non-linear impact of total bank credit is more pronounced than that of either household credit alone, or the 
sum of bank credit, debt securities, and stock market financing. (2) Credit to non-financial corporations tends to 
have a positive, while credit to households a negative impact on growth, even after allowing for non-linearities. 
(3) Debt-securities and stock market-based financing have a different impact on growth. (4) The estimated turning 
point of the non-linear relationship is close to that found by Cournède and Denk (2015) for the OECD countries, 
and lower than that established by Arcand et al. (2015) for a broad set of countries.  
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The relation between financial development and economic growth is much debated. As was 
hypothesized by Schumpeter (1934) and supported by King and Levine (1993) with numerous 
papers thereafter, differences in the level of the development of financial systems affect 
economic growth differentials among countries. The impact channels vary from additional 
financial funds, available to finance investment projects due to larger volumes of savings, to 
more efficient reallocation of funds, thus reaching the right entrepreneurs and leading to higher 
productivity (see e.g. Beck et al., 2000; Levine, 2005).  
The early empirical literature (see overviews ibidem or Panizza, 2014) suggested a positive 
association between financial development and economic growth, the former measured by e.g. 
the amount of domestic private credit or stock market capitalization relative to gross domestic 
product (GDP). The dominant positive attitude towards financial expansion encouraged a sharp 
increase in financial penetration, and the median level of private bank credit (in higher income 
countries with data reported by the Bank for International Settlements, BIS hereafter) 
constituted around 90 percent of GDP in 2014. In a number of countries, it has reached levels 
much greater than their GDP. Such high levels of financial penetration, together with recent 
and contemporary financial crises started casting doubt on the benefits of such a degree of 
financial deepening (see e.g. Beck, 2012). 
The corresponding more recent empirical work provides evidence of either a vanishing positive 
impact (as e.g. in Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011), or a potentially non-linear (often an inverse 
U-shaped) relationship as documented in numerous contemporary studies.1 Although this 
relationship can be complex and may vary, among others, with a country’s level of economic 
development and quality of financial institutions (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2013; Masten et al., 2008; Rioja and Valev, 2015), the particular functions 
performed by the financial sector (Beck et al., 2014), the speed of expansion of financial sector 
(Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Ductor and Grechyna, 2015), the ‘normality’ of the period 
under investigation (Balta and Nikolov, 2013; Breitenlechner et al., 2015; Gambacorta et al., 
2014), the high current levels of financial penetration and the recent findings of a non-linear 
impact of financial development on economic growth point to a potential of ‘too much finance’ 
in many countries, thus questioning the desirability of large financial sectors. 
                                           
1 Examples include Arcand et al. 2015; Cournède and Denk, 2015; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Law and 
Singh, 2014; and Sahay et al., 2015. 
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These findings have been mainly obtained using aggregate credit data of financial institutions, 
leaving it open whether and how much the structure of financial systems affects such results. 
First, different sources of finance (bank-based versus market-based financing) can have an 
uneven impact (see e.g. Beck and Levine, 2004; Cournède and Denk, 2015; Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al., 2013; Gambacorta et al., 2014; Langfield and Pagano, 2016; Mishra and Narayan, 2015). 
Next, fund recipients (users of finance) might matter nontrivially for the outcome. For instance, 
Beck et al. (2012) stress that a substantial household credit expansion might be hurting 
economic growth. In parallel, Bezemer et al. (2014) point out that the share of credit to 
nonfinancial business decreased sharply, while it had a significantly positive effect on growth. 
Among these lines, although warning for a small sample size, Arcand et al. (2015) indeed find 
that the non-linearity of household credit is more significant than that of firm credit.  
Nevertheless, the analysis of the importance of financial structure is currently quite limited. 
First, the impact of different components of financing are mostly analyzed individually or 
looking only at a few of them (see e.g. Cournède and Denk, 2015), thus creating potentially an 
omitted variable bias. Second, even when the analysis is performed including several 
subcomponents together (see e.g. Gambacorta et al., 2014), the difference between their 
individual and joint impact (e.g. that of total financing) is not investigated. Third, though the 
dependence of economic growth rates on bank credit financing and stock market financing is 
often analyzed, the influence of debt securities is rarely considered. Moreover, when it is, like 
in Langfield and Pagano (2016), the stock market and debt securities financing is often merged, 
which might impose an incorrect restriction and lead to biased inference. Fourth, to our 
knowledge there is no study that jointly and not individually investigates the impact of both 
the sources (bank financing, debt securities financing, and stock market financing) and the 
recipients of finance (households, non-financial corporations, and financial corporations), not 
to mention also the non-linearity. Last, but not the least, the changing structure of financing 
can lie behind the vanishing or non-linear impact of finance on economic growth;2 therefore, 
it is crucial to investigate if the impact remains non-linear after controlling for the detailed 
structure of finance that accounts for potential changes.3 As far as data limitations allow us, we 
aim at considering all these aspects in our investigation.  
                                           
2 For instance, if large finansing of households has a negative impact on growth while that of firms has a positive one, either the vanishing or 
the non-linear impact on growth of total financing can be created as the share of credit for households increases. 
3 And the other way round, it is of interest to establish if the impact of structural components remains robust after taking into account the 
nonlinear influence of financing. 
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Next, given the previously mentioned evidence that countries of different development benefit 
from different types of financing and financial penetration in a different way, it is also unclear 
whether the empirically identified non-linearity is not an artefact of mixing different groups of 
countries. For instance, Karagiannis and Kvedaras (2016) show,4 using the original Arcand et 
al. (2015) data set, that their non-linearity finding vanishes when considering more 
homogeneous sets of countries (such as that of the Organization for the Economic Co-operation 
and Development, OECD, or the European Union, EU members).5 Nevertheless, some other 
recent research (see e.g. Cournède and Denk, 2015; Cournède et al., 2015; and Samargandi et 
al., 2015) has also concentrated on smaller sets of more homogeneous countries like the OECD 
members or middle-income developing countries, and found significant non-linearity. It is of 
further interest therefore to investigate whether similar results hold for the EU countries and/or 
the founding member states of the European Monetary Union (EMU1999). These groups are 
interesting also because they are quite homogeneous in general as well as in terms of financing 
structure in particular, namely, they have strongly bank-biased financing (Langfield and 
Pagano, 2016).  
The usage of a smaller number of more homogeneous countries and the need of detailed 
financial series limit the number of observations, and influence the choice of the econometric 
methodology that can be properly employed in our case. However, in order to be more 
confident in the obtained empirical results, we do not restrict ourselves only to the EU and 
EMU1999 samples, but also provide the results for a broader set of countries; namely, the 
OECD countries where the required data are available. This not only enables us to compare our 
findings obtained using a different methodology with the already available ones (namely, 
Cournède and Denk, 2015, and Cournède et al., 2015), but also allows us to be more confident 
in the results obtained for the EU and EMU member states, given that the established patterns 
are fairly robust across all investigated groups of countries.  
Focusing on groups of high-income countries (from the OECD, EU, and EMU1999), we show 
that the finding of a non-linear, hump-shaped impact of financing on economic growth is robust 
to controlling for financing composition in terms of the sources (bank credit, debt securities, 
stock market) and the users of finances (households, non-financial and financial corporations), 
or both. In particular, we obtain the following results, which prove to be quite stable in our 
extensive robustness analysis. (1) The non-linear impact of total bank credit is more 
                                           
4 Karagiannis and Kvedaras (2016) contains preliminary research connected with this paper. 
5 And this cannot be explained solely by larger penetration of finance in more developed countries, because in the beginning of their sample 
the credit-to-GDP ratio was below even 20% in a number of such countries. 
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pronounced than that of either household credit alone, or the sum of bank credit, debt securities, 
and stock market financing. (2) Credit to non-financial corporations tends to have a positive, 
while credit to households a negative impact on growth, even after allowing for non-linearities. 
(3) Debt-securities and stock market-based financing have a different impact on growth. (4) 
The estimated turning point of the non-linear relationship is close to that found by Cournède 
and Denk (2015) for the OECD countries, and lower than that established by Arcand et al. 
(2015) for a broad set of countries.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 states the specific research questions. Section 3 
discusses data sources and variables. Section 4 presents the econometric modelling approach. 
Section 5 presents and discusses the main empirical findings and Section 6 concludes. Finally, 
some further details and robustness checks are delegated to the Appendix. 
2. Specific research questions 
The joint consideration of financial structure with a potential non-linear impact of finance on 
economic growth allows answering a number of questions. Some of them have already been 
analyzed previously in the literature, but some emerge due to the richer analysis framework 
employed here. The sequencing of the nine specific questions under investigation that will be 
listed shortly is determined by the gradual increase of the number of determinants included in 
the econometric specifications. Whereas from a conceptual point of view, they can be 
structured as follows. 
Apart from the central general question if there is too much finance leading to, potentially, 
relatively slower economic growth (question Q1), we separate three broad sets of other 
questions. The first one comprises questions of the robustness of non-linearity to taking the 
financial structure into account, or, in parallel, the robustness of the impact of financing 
components when non-linearity is included (questions Q3 and Q6).  
The second group of questions analyses the significance of non-linearity at different 
aggregation levels: going from the total sum of financing components to separate ones 
(questions Q7Q9). This also covers the question whether the non-linear impact of bank credit 
emerges due to the specificity of bank credit to households (see e.g. Beck et al., 2012), as 
investigated in the heterogeneity analysis by Arcand et al. (2015).  
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The third set of questions investigates the homogeneity of the impact of different components 
of financing or the homogeneity of the absolute impact (questions Q2, Q4 and Q5). This allows 
evaluating if various subcomponents of financing (credit to household and firms, debt securities 
issued by financial and non-financial corporations, etc.) have a different impact. Moreover, it 
also evaluates whether it is sufficient to use various ratios (like bank credit to stock market, or 
bank credit to the sum of stock market and debt securities, as e.g. in Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2013, or Langfield and Pagano, 2016), or additional disaggregation is required due to the non-
homogeneity of the impact (for such evidence see e.g. Kaserer and Rapp, 2014). Looking from 
the policy perspective, the (non-) homogeneity of impacts reveals if all components of market-
based and/or bank credit-based financing should be treated equally, e.g., if it is beneficial to 
promote all types of market-based financing in the same way. 
Consequently, we will investigate the following specific questions: 
Q1: During the analyzed period, are there signs of too much of finance overall: i.e., did all the 
different types of sources (bank credit, debt securities, and stock market financing) affect 
growth negatively?  
Q2: Is the impact of bank-based financing and market-based financing (stock market and debt 
securities) homogeneous (at least in absolute terms)? Furthermore, is the impact of market-
based financing components also homogeneous? 
Q3: Does the impact of bank credit remain non-linear even after the financing structure is taken 
into account in terms of different types of sources (bank credit, debt securities, and stock market 
financing)? 
Q4: Does economic growth benefit more from an increase of credit to firms than from that of 
credit to households? 
Q5: Does economic growth benefit more from non-financial firms issuing more debt securities 
than from financial corporations doing so? 
Q6: Does the impact of bank credit remain non-linear even after taking into account the 
recipients of bank credit (households or non-financial corporations) and that of debt securities 
(financial or non-financial corporations)?  
Q7: Does the impact of bank credit remain non-linear even after taking the non-linear impact 
of total financing (i.e. sum of bank, debt securities, and stock market financing) into account? 
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I.e., is the non-linearity of bank influence not dominated by the non-linear impact of total 
financing? 
Q8: Does the impact of bank credit remain non-linear even after taking into account the non-
linear impact of total financing as in Q7, as well as the financing structure in terms of recipients 
of financing? I.e., does the non-linear impact of total financing on growth not dominate the 
non-linearity of bank influence, even after a detailed conditioning on the composition of 
finance? 
Q9: Is credit to households mostly responsible for the hump-shaped, non-linear impact of bank 
credit on growth? 
3. Data and variables 
In order to evaluate the effects of the composition of domestic private finance on economic 
growth and their potential role in the non-linear impact of finance on growth, we need 
disaggregated data on the split of financing by the source (bank, debt securities, and stock 
market financing) as well as the recipient (households, non-financial firms, and financial 
corporations). For this, our most important source is the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) database of private non-financial sector credit and debt securities, as it provides a fairly 
detailed split of these series by the sources and users of finance. Appendix A contains a detailed 
description of the sources of all the variables that we use.  
All the employed financial variables are expressed in relative terms to GDP and used after the 
logarithmic transformation (Table 1 describes the actual transformations of variables). This is 
first of all prompted by a better fit we obtained, and also suggested by the marginal impact of 
credit on growth rates estimated and presented by Cournède and Denk (2015) in their Figure 5 
 using the logarithmic transformation we obtain the same shape of the marginal impact (see 
Figure 1 in Section 5.1 below). Whenever the original BIS data is quarterly, we use the last 
quarter to align the frequency with the annual periodicity of other data. The BIS credit database 
contains directly the ratio of credit to nominal GDP series (with a split by credit to households 
and credit to non-financial corporations). For the outstanding debt securities (with a split into 
issued by non-financial corporations and financial corporations), we calculate these ratios to 
GDP using the BIS debt securities data and the GDP data from the World Bank’s (WB) World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database. It should be pointed out that private bank credit data 
at the aggregate level (without splitting into household and firm credit) are also available from 
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the WB Global Financial Development Database (GFDD). However, the GFDD credit series 
have a number of structural breaks, whereas the BIS credit data are adjusted for breaks. Figure 
A1 in Appendix A presents several comparisons between data from the two sources, and those 
from the GFDD contain obvious structural breaks. This motivated us to use the BIS data in the 
econometric analysis.  
To represent the stock market financing of listed domestic companies, we use the market 
capitalization (in percentage of GDP) indicator from the WDI database. It should be pointed 
out that the usage of turnover ratio of domestic shares from the same database yields 
qualitatively similar results, but loses the significance, which is consistent with the analogous 
finding by Mishra and Narayan (2015). Another reason for preferring the market capitalization 
series is that its ratio to GDP is more natural and therefore aligns better with the other employed 
series that are also ratios to GDP.  
All the mentioned databases were downloaded in June 2016, and the respective extract of series 
is available upon request from the authors. The data period and number of observations to be 
used in further estimations varies depending on the particular question/specification at hand 
and the availability of data. The typical estimation period is from 1990 to 2014, whereas the 
number of actually available countries varies from 9 to 27, depending on the particular group 
of countries under investigation (OECD, EU, EMU1999) and data availability. The number of 
countries is always displayed in the tables containing the results. 
In addition to the discussed financial series, a set of usual control variables is included, 
comprising GDP per capita, enrolment in secondary education, government final consumption 
expenditure to GDP, trade openness to GDP, and inflation of consumer prices. These indicators 
come from the WB WDI database, and are also annual. The additional transformations of these 
original data are described in Table 1, and the specific choices ensure comparability with Arcand 




Short notation Description of the series used for the econometric exercise 
INC logarithm of GDP per capita 
INF the inverse hyperbolic sign transform6 (IHST) of inflation 
EDU logarithm of gross enrolment ratio in secondary education7 
GOV logarithm of government consumption to GDP 
OPN logarithm of trade openness (exports and imports to GDP) 
CREDIT logarithm of private bank credit to GDP 
CREDIT2 square of CREDIT 
DEBT_SEC 
logarithm of outstanding domestic debt securities, issued by financial and 
non-financial corporations, to GDP 
STOCKS logarithm of domestic stock market capitalization to GDP 
CREDIT-HSH logarithm of credit to households to GDP (from banks and non-banks) 
CREDIT-HSH2 square of CREDIT-HSH 
CREDIT-NFC 
logarithm of credit to non-financial corporations to GDP (from banks and 
non-banks) 
DEBT_SEC-NFC 
IHST of outstanding debt securities issued by non-financial corporations 
to GDP (see also footnote 6) 
DEBT_SEC-FCO 
IHST of outstanding debt securities issued by financial corporations to 
GDP (see also footnote 6) 
TOTAL 
logarithm of the sum of private bank credit to GDP, outstanding domestic 
debt securities to GDP, and domestic stock market capitalization to GDP 
TOTAL2 square of TOTAL 
Table 1. Notation and transformations of employed explanatory variables. 
4. Econometric modelling approach 
4.1. Modelling strategy, employed model, and parameter estimation 
Our econometric research strategy is to start from simple log-linear specifications with only 
few financial variables, and then to introduce richer specifications with more detailed structure 
and/or non-linearity. Namely, we first consider the impact of bank credit, debt securities and 
stock market on growth, i.e., the impact of different sources of financing. Afterwards, we 
further decompose finances not only by sources, but also by fund users. Finally, we merge both 
specifications discussed above with non-linear components. While presenting the whole 
                                           
6 Given a variable x, the following transformation is applied: log(x+(1+x2)0.5). Throughout our analysis, we use it instead of the natural 
logarithm in the cases where the values take also zero and/or negative values.  
7 Here we follow Gambacorta et al. (2014), using yearly data on education. 
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picture, this gradual approach thus reveals also the sensitivity of different specifications, 
without falling into potential problems connected with relatively low degrees of freedom and 
possible overfitting if only the richest specification were reported.  
Now let us turn to the model. Let i  {1,2,,N} and t  {1,2,,T} stand for country and 
period indices, correspondingly. For a fixed value of future horizon h, we consider the 
following econometric model with country and period fixed effects (i,h and t,h, respectively): 
        ?̃?𝑖,𝑡+1
(ℎ)
=  𝑖,ℎ +  𝑡,ℎ  +  ℎ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝒉
′𝒙𝒊,𝒕 + 𝑖,𝑡+1
(ℎ)
 ,                (1) 
where ?̃?𝑖,𝑡+1
ℎ  stands for the average GDP per capita growth rate over the h  1 periods ahead,8 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 denotes the logarithm of income per capita, 𝒙𝒊,𝒕 includes explanatory variables to be 
discussed shortly, ℎ and 𝒉 are the corresponding real-valued parameter and the vector of 
parameters, whereas 𝑖,𝑡+1
(ℎ)
 stands for the usual zero mean error term. It should be pointed out 
that the model is dynamic because future values 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑗, 𝑗 > 0, enter ?̃?𝑖,𝑡+1
(ℎ)
. Furthermore, since 
?̃?𝑖,𝑡+1
(ℎ)
 contains only future values, both, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 and 𝒙𝒊,𝒕 are predetermined, thus avoiding at least 
contemporaneous endogeneity in equation (1).  
The vector of explanatory variables 𝒙𝒊,𝒕 can contain various linear and non-linear terms 
(logarithms, their squares, interactions, etc.) of economic series. The two main groups comprise 
the control variables and financial series that were summarized in Table 1. 
Let us turn to the parameter estimation. When the number of periods T grows to infinity, ℎ in 
equation (1) can be consistently estimated by e.g. the fixed effects estimator. However, when 
T is fixed, due to the problem of incidental parameters, consistent estimation of ℎ cannot be 
directly obtained from equation (1) and the instrumental variable-based estimators of Anderson 
and Hsiao (1982, AH hereafter) or generalized method of moments (GMM) of Arelano and 
Bond (1991) or Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) are usually applied. 
In larger samples, the GMM estimator is known to be more efficient when T is small and N is 
large, but it has large biases when T is relatively large. On the other hand, the AH estimator is 
consistent under both N and T asymptotics (see e.g. Phillips and Han, 2014). This last property 
is very convenient in our case, because we want to estimate the impact of financial deepening 
on economic growth in the sample of EMU countries, which has a very limited number of 
                                           
8 Namely, ?̃?𝑖,𝑡+1
(ℎ)






, where for all i and t, the first difference is yi,t = yi,t - yi,t-1. It should be pointed out that very similar 
results appear when the geometric mean of gross growth rates is used instead (the gross rates are here needed as straightforward growth 
rates may also be negative). 
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countries, thus forcing us to rely more on the increase in T rather than N. Because of this, and 
in order to increase the number of observations, we do not aggregate the initial data into e.g. 5 
or 10 years periods (as in the baseline estimations of Arcand et al., 2015). That would not only 
substantially reduce the number of effective periods to a few, but also might induce pre-
aggregation bias; while the removal of business cycle effects by such a simple aggregation is 
also questionable, because the length of business cycles might vary both in time and among 
different countries. 
Consequently, the AH instrumental variable estimator will be used hereafter. In all the cases, 
the robust inference is based on standard errors adjusted for clustering by countries. 
4.2. Caveats 
The presented results should be considered with some caution due to several reasons. 
First, given our focus on a homogenous set of developed countries (most importantly: the EU 
and EMU1999), the sample size is quite limited, whereas the number of parameters is large 
due to the consideration of a detailed structure of financing. To tackle this, we use yearly data 
and not multi-year averages, as that would further shrink the number of observations. In 
addition, to increase the number of observations we consider also a larger group of countries 
(the OECD countries) and, given consistent results among various country groups, we are more 
confident in the findings established for the EU and the EMU1999. Note that a larger group 
can also cover potentially less homogenous countries where the impact of financial deepening 
and/or its structure therefore might also differ.  
Second, estimations that rely on the employed period (typically 1990-2014 or part of it) are 
informative about processes that took place during these years, but might be less indicative for 
other periods (either past or future). It is particularly true if there were substantial changes in 
the conditions, for example if there were important alterations of the financial structure or the 
inter-dependence between the structural components. In order to account for this, we try to 
control as much as possible for all relevant aspects and include all components of interest, 
which however limits the degrees of freedom. Consequently, there is a tradeoff between weak 
inferences versus potential biases due to omitted variables.  
Third, in order to avoid endogeneity stemming from simultaneous relationships, we use lagged 
explanatory variables in equation (1), i.e., it is always the future growth rates that are under 
prediction. However, this does not completely eliminate endogeneity, as expectations about 
future growth conditions can affect the choice of current levels of financial penetration, which 
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may lead to a correlation between the financial series and the error term. It is however difficult 
to find the necessary (large number of) proper instruments needed in our case, due to the 
detailed analysis of the structure. Therefore, we present our results without taking into account 
this aspect. 
Fourth, the consideration of totals together with various levels of subcomponents (even though 
in a non-linear model) might lead to multicollinearity and thus weaken the statistical inference. 
Therefore, it is possible that some estimates would turn significant when adding more data, 
once they become available in the future. 
Fifth, the complete disaggregation of finances is not available: for example, credit to 
households or financial corporations are reported from all sectors and not only from banks, 
data coverage on private domestic or total outstanding debt securities varies across countries.  
5. Empirical results 
This section presents and discusses the main empirical findings, relying on equation (1) with 
h = 5, i.e., we assess the impact of financial deepening and financing structure on the average 
five year future growth rate of GDP per capita. The results are presented in the following 
arrangement. First, we consider interactions between the composition of finance and bank 
credit (Subsection 5.1). Then we investigate whether the non-linearity of the effect of finance 
on growth is sufficiently captured by the non-linear term of bank credit alone (Subsection 5.2). 
Further robustness checks are summarized in Subsection 5.3, with the associated empirical 
results presented in Appendix B. 
The results correspond to the questions stated in Section 2. The second line in all of the 
tables identifies the relevant question connected with that particular estimation (column). The 
dependent variable is always the average five-year future growth rate of GDP per capita. 
5.1. Financing composition and non-linearity in bank credit 
Table 2 presents estimation results for the impact of composition with and without the non-
linear term for bank credit (questions Q1Q6). In general, there are always consecutive triplets 
of columns, using the same specification but for the different country groups (OECD, EU and 
EMU1999). In particular, columns (1)(3) present a basic specification with financing split 
only by its source (bank credit, debt securities, and stock market). These results answer the 
question whether all the different types of sources affected growth negatively (question Q1), 
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and whether these impacts are homogenous (question Q2). Columns (4)(6) check how much 
these results change if one adds the non-linear component of bank credit (question Q3). 
Columns (7)(9) refine the analysis of columns (1)-(3) by further splitting bank and security 
based financing by its user and thus refer to the question whether the different types of users 
affected growth negatively (question Q4 for bank credit and question Q5 for debt securities). 
Finally, columns (10)(12) augment further this financing split with the non-linear component 
of bank credit (question Q6). 
As can be seen from columns (1)(3) of Table 2, the answers to questions Q1 and Q2 are 
(strongly) negative. Even using the log-linear approximation of the impact of finance on 
growth, the impact varies substantially (even in terms of its sign) for different types of 
financing: bank credit and debt security have a significantly negative impact on growth, 
whereas stock market financing tends to have a significantly positive influence. In terms of 
bank and stock market financing, we find that the latter is more beneficial for growth, at least 
in high-income economies. This is consistent with the evidence found in many previous papers 
(see e.g. overviews by Valickova et al., 2015). In short, it is not all types of financing that affect 
growth negatively (question Q1). 
The results also reveal that the impact of the different types of sources is not homogenous 
(question Q2). In particular, the absolute values of the coefficients of bank credit and stock 
market capitalization are significantly different; therefore, the data does not support the use of 
their ratio. Next, the finding that outstanding debt securities have a negative, while stock market 
capitalization has a positive effect (see e.g. Kaserer and Rapp, 2014, for a similar finding for 
the EU countries) reveals that merging/pooling all sources of market-based financing (as e.g. 
in Langfield and Pagano, 2016) is not supported. Consequently, the equal promotion of 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Related questions Q1,Q2 Q1,Q2 Q1,Q2 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q4,Q5 Q4,Q5 Q4,Q5 Q6 Q6 Q6 
VARIABLES \ Group of cntrs.: OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 
                          
CREDIT -1.627*** -1.428*** -1.097* 9.709 13.68* 8.355**    13.36*** 18.50*** 13.60*** 
 (0.578) (0.496) (0.577) (5.990) (8.097) (4.224)    (5.155) (6.525) (4.894) 
DEBT_SEC -0.256* -0.474*** -0.386*** -0.212** -0.305*** -0.284***       
 (0.131) (0.151) (0.0992) (0.0957) (0.105) (0.102)       
STOCKS 0.0622* 0.0447 0.0315* 0.0649* 0.0467 0.0307* 0.0673* 0.0573* 0.0331 0.0725** 0.0594** 0.0348* 
 (0.0346) (0.0322) (0.0171) (0.0334) (0.0308) (0.0162) (0.0349) (0.0314) (0.0203) (0.0337) (0.0290) (0.0202) 
CREDIT2    -1.340* -1.819* -1.097**    -1.621*** -2.258*** -1.594*** 
    (0.729) (0.995) (0.493)    (0.603) (0.790) (0.573) 
CREDIT-HSH       -2.035*** -1.508** -1.733*** -1.956*** -1.559** -1.838*** 
       (0.662) (0.593) (0.627) (0.605) (0.627) (0.674) 
CREDIT-NFC       0.980* 0.471 0.754* 0.720 0.145 0.919*** 
       (0.507) (0.481) (0.417) (0.445) (0.592) (0.349) 
DEBT_SEC-FCO       -0.290 -0.304* -0.295*** -0.102 -0.0465 -0.161* 
       (0.188) (0.157) (0.0950) (0.130) (0.110) (0.0879) 
DEBT_SEC-NFC       -0.260 -0.280 -0.136 -0.244 -0.272 -0.161* 
       (0.200) (0.201) (0.0892) (0.185) (0.184) (0.0976) 
             
INC -9.196* -13.22*** -7.157 -15.29** -20.25** -9.414 -8.029* -12.15*** -7.381* -14.14*** -19.19*** -10.33** 
 (4.967) (4.026) (4.815) (7.169) (7.949) (5.880) (4.309) (3.363) (4.149) (5.457) (5.972) (4.977) 
EDU -0.141 -0.144 0.118 -0.178 -0.350 0.0381 -0.290 -0.132 -1.44e-05 -0.275 -0.282 -0.113 
 (0.432) (0.495) (0.680) (0.455) (0.541) (0.668) (0.370) (0.477) (0.583) (0.393) (0.519) (0.567) 
GOV 1.299 -0.124 4.317** -0.0744 -1.700 3.690** 1.513 0.382 4.312*** 0.414 -0.666 3.534*** 
 (1.563) (2.529) (1.887) (2.044) (3.192) (1.812) (1.324) (2.129) (1.527) (1.495) (2.234) (1.371) 
OPN -0.189 0.675 2.972*** -0.283 0.182 2.707*** -0.159 0.957 2.767*** -0.307 0.339 2.298*** 
 (0.817) (1.140) (0.861) (0.658) (1.055) (0.844) (0.741) (1.084) (0.596) (0.587) (0.932) (0.604) 
INF -3.305* -1.162 -6.441* -2.964 -0.703 -5.525* -2.854 -0.447 -5.189* -2.557 0.262 -4.144 
 (1.813) (1.880) (3.300) (1.915) (2.884) (3.347) (1.818) (2.144) (2.824) (2.262) (3.572) (2.923) 
Constant 0.489*** 0.694*** 0.705** 0.366** 0.479* 0.652** 0.645*** 0.798*** 0.751*** 0.474*** 0.540** 0.664*** 
 (0.158) (0.190) (0.285) (0.155) (0.256) (0.287) (0.174) (0.200) (0.265) (0.131) (0.231) (0.256) 
             
Observations 267 195 150 267 195 150 260 188 143 260 188 143 
R-squared 0.779 0.811 0.883 0.813 0.831 0.894 0.783 0.808 0.888 0.819 0.836 0.903 
Number of countries 21 15 9 21 15 9 21 15 9 21 15 9 
Notes:            
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Financial series are bold faced; 
Dependent variable: average GDP per capita growth rate over five years ahead (h = 5). The abbreviations of variables are explained in Table 1. 




As columns (4)(6) show, the same conclusions are robust to the introduction of the non-
linear impact of bank credit (CREDIT2). The only difference is that the linear term is positive 
for bank credit, while the quadratic term is negative. Thus, consistent with question Q3, the 
non-linear impact of bank credit remains significant (at least at the 10% level) after taking into 
account the split by the source of financing. The finding that the linear term is positive while 
the quadratic term is negative implies that there is a turning point in the impact of bank credit 
on growth (see the end of this subsection for a detailed analysis of this). It should be pointed 
out that CREDIT and CREDIT2 are highly correlated by construction, which is partly 
responsible for the moderate significance of CREDIT and CREDIT2 observed in the OECD 
and the EU.  
Turning to the impact of an even more refined financing structure (both by sources and 
users of finance) presented in columns (7)(9), we confirm earlier findings that bank credit to 
households is a drag on economic growth, whereas bank credit to firms tends to promote 
economic growth rates significantly (question Q4).  
A similar though somewhat weaker conclusion can be drawn about the importance of the 
structure of outstanding debt securities (question Q5). Namely, the coefficient of debt securities 
issued by financial corporations tends to be significantly negative, whereas that of debt 
securities issued by non-financial corporations is insignificant. Hence, the positive answer to 
question Q5 is softly supported: during the analyzed period, economic growth would have been 
higher if outstanding debt securities were issued more by non-financial corporations than by 
financial corporations. Nevertheless, the coefficient of debt securities of non-financial 
corporations is still negative. Although it is insignificant, this negative sign contrasts sharply 
with the positive coefficient of stock market capitalization, which also tends to be significant.  
The further inclusion of the non-linear bank credit term in columns (10)(12) reveals again 
that the non-linear relationship of bank credit remains robust to taking into account a finer 
decomposition of financing structure. Consequently, the positive answer to Q6 is supported. 
We again find a positive linear and a negative quadratic term, indicating a turning point (to be 
further discussed shortly).  
Looking the other way round, i.e. at the stability of results about the role of financial 
structure to the inclusion of the non-linear term, a few changes emerge. First, the findings about 
the relative benefits of promoting stock markets become even stronger as the coefficients of 
stock market capitalization become larger and more significant. Next, the differentiation 
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between the influence of different types of debt securities becomes more blurred. Similarly, the 
positive impact of bank credit to non-financial corporations becomes significant only in the 
EMU1999 case (although there it becomes more significant than without the non-linear term). 
Nevertheless, the relative inferiority of credit to households remains strongly valid. 
The main findings of Table 2 can be summarized as follows. 
- The impact of finance on economic growth differs substantially among the different types, 
and these findings are robust to presence or absence of the non-linear bank credit term. 
- During the analyzed period, bank credit was on average a drag on economic growth rates, 
but the bulk of this stems from the negative impact of household credit. 
- Nevertheless, the non-linear impact of bank credit is robust to controlling for the main 
structural composition of financing, both in terms of its source and its user. Therefore, a 
part of reduced growth can also come from the non-linear impact of ‘too much credit’, 
given that most countries in our sample have already reached credit levels higher than the 
turning point (peak of maximum contribution of credit to growth, to be characterized 
shortly).  
- Higher stock market capitalization seems to be robustly connected with higher economic 
growth, whereas larger outstanding debt securities to GDP have a negative impact (and 
significantly so for financial corporations, when the non-linear credit term is absent).  
Although these conclusions might be specific to the period under investigation, they are quite 
robust despite substantial changes in model specifications.  
Finally, let us discuss the estimated turning points of the non-linear impact of bank credit on 
growth rates. Figure 1 plots the marginal impact of bank credit on growth, with the turning 




Figure 1. The marginal impact of private bank credit to GDP on economic growth  
 
 
Notes: The figures use the estimated marginal impact of private bank credit to GDP (in %) on economic growth 
rates in the OECD, EU, and EMU1999 groups. The figures on the left (blue lines) correspond to estimates provided 
in columns (4)(6) of Table 2, using only the sources of finance. The figures on the right (red lines) use columns 
(10)(12), where both the source and user of finance are incorporated. The dashed lines indicate the 95% 
confidence bounds. To ensure visibility of the turning points, all lines start from a level of 25% of private bank 
credit. 
First, it can be seen that the estimated turning point is smaller when finance is split only in 
terms of sources. In this case, it is below 50% of GDP and varies from 37% to 46% depending 
on a group of countries. Furthermore, considering the % confidence bounds, the marginal 
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impact of financing here is never found to be significantly positive. On the other hand, the 
positive contribution becomes significant when a more detailed split of financing is employed 
(also by the user of finance). In this case, the turning point also increases and ranges from 61% 
to 72% in the different country groups. It is interesting to note that these point estimates (in 
particular, 62% of GDP for the OECD) compare well with that obtained by Cournède and Denk 
(2015) for the OECD countries, using a longer intermediate credit series (their estimated 
turning point is about 60% of GDP). However, these point estimates are in general lower than 
those established by Arcand et al. (2015), using their global sample of countries. Nevertheless, 
the mentioned difference is less evident once looking at the confidence bands: for some 
specifications provided in Arcand et al. (2015), the difference is statistically significant, 
whereas for others it is not. 
5.2. Financing structure and other non-linearity questions 
In this subsection, we explore whether the non-linearity of the effect of finance on growth 
is sufficiently captured by the non-linear term of bank credit alone. Maybe the total amount of 
financing from all the different sources is more relevant than bank credit alone in generating 
the non-linearity, conditionally either only on the sources of financing (question Q7) or the 
sources and users of financing (question Q8)? Alternatively, maybe household credit is solely 
responsible for the non-linear impact of bank credit,9 thus, after taking it into account, the non-
linearity of total bank credit vanishes (question Q9)? 
In order to answer these questions, we investigate the statistical significance of the respective 
non-linear terms. Table 3 presents the corresponding empirical findings. Columns (1)(3) 
include both the non-linear term of bank credit and that of the total financing, conditioning on 
the sources of financing. Columns (4)(6) also condition on the users of finance. Finally, 
columns (7)(9) compare the relative significance of the non-linear terms of total bank credit 
and of household credit only. 
  
                                           
9 Since Arcand et al. (2015) find that the non-linearity of household credit is more prevalent than that of firm 
credit, we present here only the results for household credit. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Related questions Q7 Q7 Q7 Q8 Q8 Q8 Q9 Q9 Q9 
VARIABLES \ Group of cntrs.: OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 
                    
CREDIT 9.013 12.91 7.473 13.50** 17.71*** 13.09*** 13.06** 14.18** 20.67*** 
 (6.329) (8.151) (4.699) (5.913) (6.838) (4.980) (6.070) (5.546) (4.921) 
DEBT_SEC -0.217* -0.328*** -0.314***       
 (0.120) (0.127) (0.106)       
STOCKS 0.0818* 0.0360 -0.0126 0.0902*** 0.0424 0.000559 0.0722** 0.0534* 0.0395** 
 (0.0425) (0.0386) (0.0390) (0.0320) (0.0463) (0.0417) (0.0320) (0.0276) (0.0194) 
CREDIT-HSH    -1.967*** -1.517** -1.815*** -1.751 1.705 -11.70*** 
    (0.650) (0.659) (0.641) (3.454) (4.813) (3.708) 
CREDIT-NFC    0.713* 0.140 0.881** 0.716 0.132 0.933*** 
    (0.409) (0.617) (0.383) (0.482) (0.584) (0.260) 
DEBT_SEC-FCO    -0.0863 -0.0829 -0.176** -0.103 -0.0530 -0.174** 
    (0.133) (0.131) (0.0829) (0.127) (0.116) (0.0716) 
DEBT_SEC-NFC    -0.242 -0.273 -0.154 -0.243 -0.259 -0.175* 
    (0.188) (0.188) (0.103) (0.185) (0.175) (0.0984) 
CREDIT2 -1.251 -1.716* -1.005* -1.635** -2.160*** -1.543*** -1.584** -1.722*** -2.442*** 
 (0.769) (0.999) (0.538) (0.683) (0.825) (0.584) (0.693) (0.657) (0.574) 
TOTAL 0.569 2.761 1.818 -0.367 2.278 1.048    
 (2.087) (3.787) (2.342) (2.147) (3.762) (1.563)    
TOTAL2 -0.0662 -0.268 -0.152 0.0269 -0.216 -0.0823    
 (0.187) (0.344) (0.209) (0.199) (0.345) (0.137)    
CREDIT-HSQ2       -0.0294 -0.494 1.327*** 
       (0.473) (0.703) (0.498) 
INC -14.98** -21.23*** -9.907 -13.97*** -20.02*** -10.70** -14.15*** -18.93*** -12.05*** 
 (6.988) (7.254) (6.181) (5.272) (5.539) (5.222) (5.446) (5.702) (3.233) 
EDU -0.182 -0.363 0.0498 -0.290 -0.295 -0.102 -0.276 -0.317 -0.120 
 (0.456) (0.548) (0.664) (0.394) (0.517) (0.558) (0.393) (0.524) (0.598) 
GOV -0.0535 -1.888 3.729* 0.464 -0.811 3.573** 0.427 -0.347 2.789** 
 (2.007) (3.130) (1.979) (1.415) (2.183) (1.516) (1.505) (1.986) (1.090) 
OPN -0.268 -0.0111 2.715*** -0.295 0.186 2.321*** -0.306 0.319 2.192*** 
 (0.655) (1.027) (0.926) (0.595) (0.902) (0.678) (0.587) (0.922) (0.500) 
INF -3.047 -0.956 -5.081 -2.604 0.0418 -3.836 -2.541 0.376 -4.327 
 (1.908) (3.008) (3.310) (2.257) (3.549) (2.970) (2.473) (3.591) (2.972) 
Constant 0.388*** 0.433** 0.644** 0.483*** 0.500*** 0.653** 0.475*** 0.551** 0.601*** 
 (0.148) (0.193) (0.306) (0.131) (0.185) (0.270) (0.136) (0.227) (0.231) 
          
Observations 267 195 150 260 188 143 260 188 143 
R-squared 0.812 0.832 0.897 0.819 0.838 0.904 0.819 0.837 0.910 
Number of countries 21 15 9 21 15 9 21 15 9 
Notes:          
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Financial series are bold faced; 
Dependent variable: average GDP per capita growth rate over five years ahead (h = 5). The abbreviations of variables are explained in Table 1. 
Table 3. Financing structure and non-linearity of financing.  
 
Comparing the significance of the linear and non-linear terms of bank credit (CREDIT, 
CREDIT2) and total financing (TOTAL, TOTAL2) in columns (1)(6) of Table 3, one can see 
that the impact of bank credit is consistently more significant than that of the total financing. 
Although the difference is moderate in columns (1)(3), where we control only for the sources 
of finance (in connection with question Q7), there is little doubt about the substantial difference 
in significance when a detailed financing structure is taken into account (columns (4)(6), in 
relation to question Q8). Therefore, we can infer that bank credit seems to dominate in the 
hump-shaped finance-growth relationship.  
One can draw similar conclusions from columns (7)(9), regarding the relative significance of 
the non-linearity of household credit and (total) bank credit (question Q9). Bank credit retains 
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uniformly not only the sign of both its linear and non-linear terms, but also the significance, 
whereas the non-linearity connected with household credit does not only change signs 
irregularly, but also becomes insignificant in the OECD and EU samples. In the EMU1999 
case, the terms of household credit are significant, but it is more likely to occur due to the small 
number of observations, potentially coupled with multicollinearity of bank credit and 
household credit terms (and their squares). 
We therefore can infer that, even after controlling for a quite detailed structure of financing, 
the hump-shaped, non-linear impact of finance on growth seems to be most strongly connected 
with (total) bank credit. 
5.3. Robustness checks 
In this subsection, we summarize the implications of some robustness checks. We look at the 
impact of varying the length of future horizons (h), excluding outlier observations, including 
dummy-interaction variables for the latest after-crisis period, reducing the number of variables 
(dropping period effects, dropping controls, leaving only the most significant principal 
component of controls), using ratios to represent the composition of financing instead of an 
unconstrained estimation, additional modeling of dynamics (by including the changes of 
explanatory variables or including autoregressive terms of the dependent variable), and 
including an additional indicator for accelerating real housing prices. Appendix B describes the 
implementation details. 
In order to save space, we mostly concentrate on the sensitivity analysis of the main results 
provided in Table 2: either the whole table whenever possible, or a part of it, namely, the 
specification connected with question Q6 (which has the most detailed split of financing 
composition). Due to the same reason, all tables associated with the empirical estimation results 
are delegated to Appendix B.  
The results of the performed robustness analysis can be summarized as follows. In general, the 
previously discussed main findings are quite robust to the considered deviations from the 
baseline specifications considered in Table 2. The least robust one is about the impact of the 
composition of outstanding debt securities: although the negative sign of debt securities issued 
by both the financial and non-financial corporations is dominant, the ranking of its 
subcomponents becomes less obvious in many of the performed investigations.  
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Some additional interesting aspects are worth singling out. First, the negative impact of 
household financing seems to emerge more over longer periods, and is much smaller in shorter 
horizons, as revealed both by tables B1 and B8. Next, the positive impact of stock market 
financing seems to be mostly observed during periods of accelerating real housing prices as 
illustrated in table B10, after which economic growth is significantly lower, but less so in 
countries that relied more on capital markets during the associated housing market spur. The 
analogous impact of debt securities was not observed and even had a negative sign, which can 
be connected also with the bank strategies to finance housing loans by issuing debt securities.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper contributed to the analysis of the impact of finances on economic growth by 
incorporating the structure of financing and allowing for the non-linearity of the impact of 
finances, in homogeneous groups of high-income countries. Our results reveal that the 
significance of the non-linear impact of bank credit is robust to controlling for a fairly detailed 
composition of private finances. Furthermore, results are very similar in all the three high-
income groups of countries considered (member states from the OECD, EU, and EMU1999).  
Besides its robustness, we find the following additional features of this non-linearity. The non-
linear impact of total bank credit is more pronounced than that of either only household credit 
or the joint sum of bank credit, debt securities, and stock market financing. The estimated 
turning point/threshold of the identified non-linear relationship is smaller than that established 
e.g. in Arcand et al. (2015) using a global panel, while it is in line with that estimated for the 
OECD countries by Cournède and Denk (2015). Therefore, a large bank credit penetration 
relative to GDP (especially with heavy financing of households) might be more harmful to 
economic growth in high-income countries than thought previously. At the same time, due to 
the dominance of bank-biased financing in the EU, even a simple reduction of bank credit 
relative to GDP could result in improved economic growth rates in a number of EU countries.  
We also find and/or confirm many important aspects of the role of financing composition, even 
after controlling for the non-linearity discussed above. First, the impact of bank credit to 
households and non-financial corporations qualitatively differ: in our sample, the former had a 
strongly negative, whereas the latter tended to have a positive impact on economic growth. 
Consequently, if a reduction of bank credit were beneficial for a particular economy in general, 
the strongest promotion to growth could be achieved by shrinking household credit.  
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This established empirical finding seems to support the hypothesis that, in the long run, 
household credit diverts funds of limited supply from firms that could generate longer-lasting 
positive development. This can become especially acute during housing market booms, periods 
that facilitate expansion of credit to households by creating larger values of collateral 
acceptable to banks and larger returns in this market. We indeed find that, during periods of 
significantly positive real housing inflation, growth was further reduced besides what has 
already been captured by the amounts of credit to households directly. Thus, either housing 
credit has a further negative impact on long-term growth relative to total household credit (e.g., 
it may create a drag on households’ willingness to work productively), or the actually realized 
amounts of household credit do not reveal its whole negative influence (e.g., banks shrank firm 
financing more by foreseeing the need of additional household borrowing in the future).  
Next, the growth impact of stock market and debt security financing are qualitatively different: 
stock market financing has a positive, whereas debt securities tend to have a negative influence 
on growth. Looking from both the methodological and policy perspectives, this would suggest 
that the use of financing aggregates and the equal promotion of all types of market-based modes 
of financing might be just as misleading as cutting all types of bank credit.  
Although statistically less clear-cut, we have found some evidence that shifting currently 
outstanding debt securities from financial corporations towards the non-financial ones could 
be beneficial for growth. This can be due to several factors at play. First, a substantial part of 
debt securities issued by financial institutions is connected to the financing of housing, which 
we find to have a negative impact on growth. Furthermore, international financial markets are 
highly integrated, and financial institutions issuing debt securities can outsource domestic 
savings from high-income economies to other countries easily, thus reducing the local funding 
of investments. On the other hand, given the increased total globalization of corporate 
activities, it can be a potential explanation also for the negative sign (though smaller absolute 
value) of the impact of non-financial corporations. 
Finally, from the policy perspective, our results point to several alternatives connected with the 
financial deepness and its structure that would promote economic growth. Regarding the 
banking sector, growth would be increased both by directing more credit towards non-financial 
corporations and by reducing the bank credit to GDP levels in a number of European countries 
(especially, from the EMU). The reduction of household credit, which simultaneously 
diminishes the total amount of credit and favorably changes its composition, can have the 
largest economic impact. However, the effect of a reduction of the total amount of bank credit 
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also depends nontrivially on the initial conditions of a particular economy (namely, the actual 
distance from the peak impact of credit, the level of penetration of all modes of finance, etc.). 
Therefore, for economies that are close to the turning point of the non-linear impact, a balanced 
compositional shift towards firm financing without affecting the total amount of credit might 
be best suited. The further development of market-based financing seems to be mostly 
beneficial through the fostering of stock markets.  
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APPENDIX A: Data 
 
 
Table A1: Sources of Original Data 
Variable 
(notation of related series after transformations 
defined in Table 1 of main text) 
Source (all downloaded in June 2016) 
Total credit by banks to the private non-financial 
sector, adjusted for structural breaks (CREDIT). 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Credit 
to the Non-financial Sector. 
Outstanding debt securities (DEBT_SEC). 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Debt 
Securities Statistics. 
Market capitalization of listed domestic 
companies as a percentage of GDP (STOCKS). 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(WDI). 
Private credit received by households (CREDIT-
HSH). 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Credit 
to the Non-financial Sector. 
Private credit received by non-financial 
corporations (CREDIT-NFC). 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Credit 
to the Non-financial Sector. 
Outstanding debt securities issued by financial 
corporations (DEBT_SEC-FCO). 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Debt 
Securities Statistics. 
Outstanding debt securities issued by non-
financial corporations (DEBT_SEC-NFC). 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Debt 
Securities Statistics. 
GDP per capita, constant LCU (INC). 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(WDI). 
Inflation of consumer prices, annual % (INF).  World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(WDI). 
Gross enrolment ratio, secondary, both sexes, in 
% of the corresponding age group (EDU) 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(WDI). 
General government final consumption 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP (GOV). 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(WDI). 
Trade openness, calculated as exports plus 
imports divided by GDP (OPN).  







Figure A1. Bank credit to GDP (in %), from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) credit 
database and the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) of the World Bank. Selected 
sample of countries having structural breaks: Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark 





APPENDIX B: Robustness checks 
 
We perform the following robustness checks. 
Varying the future horizon h (Table B1). In addition to the main five-year horizon considered 
in the previous tables, we present the estimation results for a broader range of future horizon 
values, namely, h  {3,4,5,6,7} for the specification connected with question Q6. However, it 
should be kept in mind that higher horizons used for calculation of average yearly economic 
growth rates reduce further the degrees of freedom.  
Excluding outlier observations (Table B2). This table presents the results of the re-estimation 
of the specifications of Table 2, after removing observations (separately in each specification) 
that result in residuals being greater than three standard errors. On average, such an operation 
reduces the number of observations by 30% as compared to those in Table 2.  
Including dummy-interaction variables of the latest after-crisis period (Table B3). To 
investigate the stability of parameter estimates, we include the interaction terms of financing 
sources (of bank, debt securities, and stock market financing) with the crisis period dummies 
in the specification connected with question Q6. Because in the main estimations we 
considered five-year ahead periods of growth rates as defined in equation (1), the included 
interaction terms start from 2003. Hence, starting from 2003, the five-year average growth rate 
includes only the 2008 crisis period, starting from 2004, it includes 2008 and 2009, and so on. 
In such a way, it is possible to allow for a time varying impact of the crisis. It should be also 
pointed out that there is no need to include additional dummies without interaction, since our 
specifications already have period fixed effects. It should be again kept in mind that this 
increases further the number of estimated parameters. 
Reducing the number of variables  dropping period effects (Table B4), dropping potentially 
insignificant controls10 (Table B5), or leaving only the most significant principal component of 
controls (Table B6). The main concern regarding the basic estimation is the low degree of 
freedom. Therefore, we present several sensitivity evaluations of Table 2 by reducing the 
number of parameters under estimation. First, we drop period dummies as in Table B4. Next, 
we keep only the initial income variable that is always significant, and drop the remaining ones 
that in many specifications were insignificant (Table B5). Finally, since omitted variables can 
                                           
10 See the last paragraph of Section 3 for the set of control variables. 
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create estimation bias, we also use the most significant principal component from previously 
omitted variables to reduce it (Table B6). 
Using ratios to represent the composition of financing (Table B7). The main findings reveal 
that the estimates using ratios are likely to be biased. Nevertheless, the use of ratios allows 
reducing the number of estimated parameters and the variability of the estimates. Hence, we 
also study if the results are similar to those presented in Table 2, whenever ratios of proper 
variables are employed instead of the unconstrained estimation. Namely, we use: a) the 
logarithm of the ratio of outstanding debt securities to bank credit (DEBT_SEC / CREDIT) 
and the logarithm of the ratio of stock market capitalization to bank credit (STOCKS / 
CREDIT) to represent the composition of financing by type of instrument; b) the logarithm of 
the ratio of credit to household and non-financial corporations (CREDIT-HSH / CREDIT-
NFC) to represent the credit structure; and c) the logarithm of the ratio of outstanding debt 
securities issued by financial and non-financial corporations (DEBT_SEC-FCO / DEBT_SEC-
NFC) to represent the composition of debt securities. 
Additional modelling of dynamics  included first differences of explanatory variables (Table 
B8) or included lagged left hand side variable (Table B9). Despite that further terms in the 
equations increase the number of parameters, we also investigate the sensitivity of the results 
of Table 2 to the inclusion of additional dynamic terms: the first difference of explanatory 
variables as in Table B8, and the lagged left hand side variable as in Table B9. 
Including a dummy variable for accelerating real housing prices (Table B10). The expansion 
of household credit was influenced by an increasing credit for housing needs, which in turn 
interacts strongly with housing price developments. The recent crisis and housing price bubbles 
suggest that this aspect could have been behind the negative impact of bank credit to 
households. Although we do not have the respective split of household credit, we investigate 
the significance of a dummy variable (and its interactions) of an accelerated increase in housing 
prices (as motivated by the studies of Langfield and Pagano, 2016, and Karagiannis and 
Kvedaras, 2016). In particular, the dummy takes a value of one if the real growth rate of housing 
prices exceeds one percentage point and zero otherwise.  





List of tables: 
 
1. Table B1:   Varying the future horizon h. 
2. Table B2:   Excluded outlier observations. 
3. Table B3:   Included dummy-interaction variables of the latest after-crisis period. 
4. Table B4:   Reduced number of variables  dropping period effects. 
5. Table B5:   Reduced number of variables  dropping potentially insignificant 
controls. 
6. Table B6:   Reduced number of variables  leaving only the most significant principal 
component of controls. 
7. Table B7:   Using ratios to represent the composition of financing. 
8. Table B8:   Additional modelling of dynamics  included changes of explanatory 
variables. 
9. Table B9:   Additional modelling of dynamics  included autoregressive term. 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Related questions Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 
Future horizon: (h=3) (h=3) (h=3) (h=4) (h=4) (h=4) (h=5) (h=5) (h=5) (h=6) (h=6) (h=6) (h=7) (h=7) (h=7) 
VARIABLES \ Group 
of cntrs.: OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 
                                
CREDIT 19.55*** 20.87*** 25.64*** 19.28*** 24.03*** 25.37*** 13.36*** 18.50*** 13.60*** 12.50** 19.52*** 10.41*** 3.506 7.592* -1.168 
 (5.101) (6.506) (4.864) (4.705) (7.176) (3.970) (5.155) (6.525) (4.894) (5.937) (6.213) (3.153) (4.472) (4.248) (3.430) 
CREDIT2 -2.377*** -2.458*** -2.970*** -2.376*** -2.814*** -2.942*** -1.621*** -2.258*** -1.594*** -1.449** -2.263*** -1.230*** -0.374 -0.793 0.120 
 (0.531) (0.719) (0.529) (0.550) (0.827) (0.451) (0.603) (0.790) (0.573) (0.671) (0.737) (0.378) (0.504) (0.492) (0.422) 
STOCKS 0.0315 0.0304 0.0824 0.0438 -0.00599 -0.00765 0.0725** 0.0594** 0.0348* 0.00881 -0.00314 0.00252 0.0498 0.0227 0.0129 
 (0.0564) (0.0658) (0.0590) (0.0427) (0.0292) (0.0167) (0.0337) (0.0290) (0.0202) (0.0478) (0.0458) (0.0308) (0.0314) (0.0334) (0.0176) 
CREDIT-HSH -0.645 -1.326 -1.338 -1.914** -2.625*** -1.949** -1.956*** -1.559** -1.838*** -2.371*** -2.702*** -2.355*** -2.063*** -2.900*** -1.490* 
 (1.178) (1.347) (1.379) (0.872) (0.957) (0.862) (0.605) (0.627) (0.674) (0.486) (0.352) (0.732) (0.744) (0.852) (0.780) 
CREDIT-NFC -0.178 -0.254 1.172 0.185 -0.306 0.828 0.720 0.145 0.919*** 0.361 0.324 0.794* 0.514 0.405 0.561 
 (0.912) (0.776) (0.753) (0.629) (0.692) (0.720) (0.445) (0.592) (0.349) (0.411) (0.510) (0.422) (0.330) (0.434) (0.369) 
DEBT_SEC-FCO -0.317 0.0349 -0.127 -0.0771 0.188 -0.125 -0.102 -0.0465 -0.161* 0.0549 0.176* 0.205 -0.191 -0.102 -0.00232 
 (0.273) (0.238) (0.183) (0.246) (0.218) (0.160) (0.130) (0.110) (0.0879) (0.119) (0.0997) (0.211) (0.209) (0.263) (0.240) 
DEBT_SEC-NFC 0.118 0.120 -0.328* -0.0964 -0.102 -0.156* -0.244 -0.272 -0.161* -0.253 -0.276 -0.151 -0.171 -0.176 0.00349 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.186) (0.134) (0.115) (0.0924) (0.185) (0.184) (0.0976) (0.197) (0.193) (0.0989) (0.119) (0.130) (0.102) 
INC -18.02 -21.77*** -16.57 -14.26* -18.48*** -12.78* -14.14*** -19.19*** -10.33** -10.82 -15.89** -5.819 -6.199 -6.411 -0.0721 
 (13.00) (8.127) (10.75) (8.529) (5.163) (7.448) (5.457) (5.972) (4.977) (7.033) (8.051) (5.900) (6.660) (6.677) (10.31) 
EDU -1.449 -0.325 -0.0877 0.155 0.690* 0.730** -0.275 -0.282 -0.113 -0.531 -0.664 0.201 -0.198 -0.0582 0.600 
 (1.109) (0.606) (0.753) (0.442) (0.376) (0.298) (0.393) (0.519) (0.567) (0.476) (0.605) (0.318) (0.438) (0.498) (0.474) 
GOV 1.761 -1.150 1.961 1.321 -0.549 2.241* 0.414 -0.666 3.534*** 0.857 -0.754 3.667*** 1.307 2.622** 4.116** 
 (2.798) (2.696) (2.764) (2.309) (1.917) (1.348) (1.495) (2.234) (1.371) (1.878) (2.569) (1.163) (1.059) (1.163) (1.699) 
OPN -1.215 -0.0818 2.551* -0.846 -0.162 2.922*** -0.307 0.339 2.298*** -0.173 -0.474 1.489** 0.207 0.768 2.320* 
 (0.836) (1.286) (1.389) (0.968) (1.342) (0.635) (0.587) (0.932) (0.604) (0.414) (0.614) (0.741) (0.394) (0.670) (1.271) 
INF -1.972 -4.311 3.521 4.123 4.612* 0.804 -2.557 0.262 -4.144 -1.332 -0.801 -6.896** 4.362** 7.010*** -2.932 
 (3.199) (3.258) (8.374) (2.920) (2.401) (3.364) (2.262) (3.572) (2.923) (1.521) (2.311) (2.828) (1.855) (2.363) (3.620) 
                
Constant 0.487*** 0.464** 0.000352 0.101 0.189 -0.291 0.474*** 0.540** 0.664*** 0.247** 0.331** 0.0723 0.131 0.150 -0.224 
 (0.149) (0.185) (0.249) (0.162) (0.186) (0.218) (0.131) (0.231) (0.256) (0.0980) (0.160) (0.0880) (0.194) (0.242) (0.288) 
                
Observations 296 212 162 277 199 152 260 188 143 244 178 135 226 166 127 
R-squared 0.780 0.811 0.861 0.763 0.794 0.890 0.819 0.836 0.903 0.776 0.830 0.842 0.726 0.753 0.765 
Number of countries 23 17 11 22 16 10 21 15 9 21 15 9 21 15 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Financial series are bold faced; 
Dependent variable: average GDP per capita growth rate over various periods ahead. The abbreviations of variables are explained in Table 1. 
Table B1. Robustness checks: future horizon in years for calculating the average yearly growth rate (h  {3,4,5,6,7}). 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Related questions Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q6 Q6 Q6 
VARIABLES \ Group of cntrs.: OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 
                          
CREDIT -1.877*** -1.462** -1.446** 5.064 12.34* 8.556    20.92** 27.95*** 11.12 
 (0.554) (0.649) (0.617) (7.824) (6.993) (7.181)    (8.574) (8.278) (9.104) 
DEBT_SEC -0.746* -0.969** -0.549*** -0.650 -0.725 -0.347**       
 (0.424) (0.429) (0.117) (0.474) (0.491) (0.176)       
STOCKS 0.0438 0.0256 0.0427*** 0.0484* 0.0315 0.0438*** 0.0912 0.0872* 0.0435 0.123** 0.120** 0.0553* 
 (0.0299) (0.0218) (0.0157) (0.0274) (0.0207) (0.0166) (0.0589) (0.0525) (0.0277) (0.0590) (0.0527) (0.0288) 
CREDIT2    -0.805 -1.634* -1.142    -2.482** -3.357*** -1.379 
    (0.883) (0.839) (0.801)    (0.977) (0.954) (1.025) 
CREDIT-HSH       -3.131*** -2.260** -1.782* -2.961*** -2.523** -1.324 
       (1.011) (0.891) (1.042) (1.011) (1.032) (0.971) 
CREDIT-NFC       1.941** 1.530** -0.0174 1.616*** 1.497** 0.461 
       (0.777) (0.773) (0.756) (0.517) (0.593) (0.661) 
DEBT_SEC-FCO       -0.396* -0.636*** -0.403** 0.00945 0.0233 -0.229 
       (0.230) (0.231) (0.164) (0.227) (0.219) (0.203) 
DEBT_SEC-NFC       -0.641** -0.702*** -0.160 -0.655** -0.720*** -0.167 
       (0.255) (0.254) (0.113) (0.261) (0.274) (0.102) 
INC -7.263 -13.25*** -7.902*** -10.30 -18.34*** -10.01*** -3.512 -10.35*** -9.102*** -11.71* -18.31*** -10.09*** 
 (5.391) (4.397) (2.364) (6.952) (5.728) (3.655) (5.290) (2.693) (2.127) (6.622) (5.618) (3.101) 
EDU 0.199 0.0589 0.243 0.121 -0.122 0.156 0.286 0.286 0.157 0.107 0.0255 0.186 
 (0.547) (0.583) (0.707) (0.564) (0.626) (0.740) (0.532) (0.617) (0.659) (0.596) (0.724) (0.740) 
GOV -0.303 -2.505 2.434*** -0.587 -3.027 2.299*** 1.240 -1.392 2.853** 0.740 -1.357 2.708*** 
 (1.644) (2.468) (0.845) (1.785) (2.597) (0.885) (1.511) (1.797) (1.147) (1.412) (1.584) (1.047) 
OPN -0.985 -0.445 1.478* -0.893 -0.505 1.566** -0.821 -0.171 1.912** -0.772 -0.523 1.677** 
 (0.785) (1.409) (0.824) (0.797) (1.191) (0.772) (0.679) (1.412) (0.769) (0.525) (0.980) (0.679) 
INF -3.369* -1.296 -3.347 -4.161** -2.672 -3.154 -3.955** -3.135 -2.517 -6.425*** -6.010* -3.242 
 (1.963) (1.426) (3.063) (1.702) (2.240) (3.236) (1.791) (2.341) (3.325) (1.902) (3.136) (3.443) 
Constant 0.642*** 0.804*** 0.711*** 0.541*** 0.580*** 0.638** 0.798*** 0.877*** 0.787*** 0.448*** 0.367 0.671** 
 (0.212) (0.276) (0.262) (0.123) (0.203) (0.268) (0.246) (0.279) (0.290) (0.158) (0.225) (0.279) 
             
Observations 188 143 115 188 143 115 181 136 108 181 136 108 
R-squared 0.772 0.821 0.901 0.789 0.837 0.905 0.771 0.820 0.900 0.821 0.858 0.906 
Number of countries 19 14 9 19 14 9 19 14 9 19 14 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Financial series are bold faced; 
Dependent variable: average GDP per capita growth rate over various periods ahead. The abbreviations of variables are explained in Table 1. 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Related questions Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 Q6 
Interaction term: CREDIT CREDIT CREDIT DEBT_SEC DEBT_SEC DEBT_SEC STOCKS STOCKS STOCKS 
VARIABLES \ Group of cntrs.: OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 
                    
CREDIT 9.892* 15.76* 11.88** 16.38** 21.90*** 16.11*** 15.50*** 18.92*** 12.60*** 
 (5.987) (8.521) (5.388) (6.971) (7.915) (4.229) (5.557) (6.503) (4.521) 
CREDIT2 -1.093 -1.777* -1.387** -1.943** -2.566*** -1.875*** -1.879*** -2.277*** -1.450*** 
 (0.704) (0.984) (0.666) (0.804) (0.905) (0.477) (0.642) (0.788) (0.537) 
STOCKS 0.0674*** 0.0549** 0.0355* 0.0746** 0.0515* 0.0360* 0.0627** 0.0671*** 0.0442** 
 (0.0261) (0.0241) (0.0188) (0.0365) (0.0304) (0.0215) (0.0293) (0.0260) (0.0176) 
CREDIT-HSH -2.373*** -2.216*** -1.971*** -2.040*** -2.027*** -1.963*** -1.751*** -1.799** -2.083*** 
 (0.521) (0.423) (0.675) (0.515) (0.507) (0.746) (0.675) (0.730) (0.800) 
CREDIT-NFC 0.521 0.0745 0.911*** 0.634* 0.254 1.030*** 0.747* 0.306 1.087*** 
 (0.414) (0.593) (0.344) (0.363) (0.553) (0.359) (0.445) (0.577) (0.367) 
DEBT_SEC-FCO -0.0839 -0.0950 -0.182** -0.0999 -0.0922 -0.191** -0.0867 -0.0253 -0.114* 
 (0.122) (0.102) (0.0839) (0.194) (0.172) (0.0952) (0.115) (0.0884) (0.0678) 
DEBT_SEC-NFC -0.241 -0.282 -0.109 -0.204 -0.230 -0.174 -0.246 -0.294 -0.221** 
 (0.183) (0.181) (0.114) (0.149) (0.152) (0.110) (0.188) (0.186) (0.101) 
INC -16.91*** -22.38*** -9.545** -14.13*** -19.49*** -10.05** -15.13*** -19.14*** -8.816* 
 (5.195) (6.592) (3.919) (4.177) (5.265) (4.910) (5.273) (6.203) (4.746) 
EDU -0.0623 0.0156 -0.452 0.0932 -0.0117 -0.286 -0.251 -0.302 -0.159 
 (0.455) (0.593) (0.501) (0.434) (0.558) (0.506) (0.391) (0.491) (0.502) 
GOV 0.249 -0.921 3.976*** 0.474 -0.364 3.722** -0.0892 -0.548 3.674** 
 (1.483) (2.318) (1.421) (1.215) (1.654) (1.632) (1.555) (2.263) (1.525) 
OPN -0.265 0.173 2.348*** -0.228 0.605 2.239*** -0.377 0.403 2.377*** 
 (0.525) (0.901) (0.437) (0.609) (0.802) (0.544) (0.638) (0.842) (0.554) 
INF -3.608* -1.876 -3.093 -3.466** -1.026 -3.364 -2.051 0.486 -5.241** 
 (1.897) (3.325) (3.144) (1.533) (2.176) (3.701) (2.098) (2.905) (2.435) 
Interact.term * I(year>=2003) -0.0908 -0.228 0.381** -0.00178 -0.0311 0.181*** 0.0851 0.0793 0.0432 
 (0.226) (0.239) (0.174) (0.0422) (0.0575) (0.0687) (0.125) (0.146) (0.0936) 
Interact.term * I(year>=2004) -0.460 -0.555 0.688 -0.162 -0.230* 0.0923 -0.0795 -0.253 -0.257 
 (0.366) (0.416) (0.509) (0.111) (0.138) (0.191) (0.256) (0.278) (0.303) 
Interact.term * I(year>=2005) -0.0730 -0.126 -0.148 0.0925 0.0620 -0.0969 -0.0927 -0.210** -0.264*** 
 (0.144) (0.130) (0.215) (0.0811) (0.103) (0.0700) (0.117) (0.0932) (0.0917) 
Interact.term * I(year>=2006) -0.365** -0.366** -0.512*** 0.237 0.244 -0.0546 -0.0357 -0.0948 -0.0663 
 (0.148) (0.184) (0.198) (0.215) (0.231) (0.146) (0.108) (0.108) (0.152) 
Interact.term * I(year>=2007) -0.262** -0.306* -0.544*** 0.121 0.155 0.00550 0.295*** 0.129 0.00201 
 (0.127) (0.176) (0.163) (0.142) (0.153) (0.118) (0.0982) (0.120) (0.251) 
Interact.term * I(year>=2008) -0.385*** -0.372 0.0823 -0.0938* -0.0893 -0.107 0.0192 -0.0211 0.221 
 (0.137) (0.280) (0.205) (0.0490) (0.0976) (0.0705) (0.141) (0.214) (0.173) 
Interact.term * I(year>=2009) -0.121 -0.183 0.145 -0.0103 -0.136 -0.0929 -0.0348 -0.0754 -0.0153 
 (0.104) (0.197) (0.135) (0.0246) (0.0956) (0.154) (0.141) (0.219) (0.190) 
          
Constant 0.394*** 0.433* 0.692*** 0.423*** 0.560*** 0.662*** 0.377* 0.717*** 0.829** 
 (0.115) (0.230) (0.221) (0.118) (0.188) (0.242) (0.222) (0.259) (0.326) 
          
Observations 260 188 143 260 188 143 260 188 143 
R-squared 0.833 0.845 0.911 0.834 0.856 0.905 0.825 0.842 0.903 
Number of countries 21 15 9 21 15 9 21 15 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Financial series are bold faced; 
Dependent variable: average GDP per capita growth rate over various periods ahead. The abbreviations of variables are explained in Table 1. 
Table B3. Robustness checks: crisis period dummy interaction terms (an interaction term 
used in each case is specified in the third line, which is bolded).  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Related questions Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q6 Q6 Q6 
VARIABLES \ Group of cntrs.: OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 
CREDIT -3.359*** -3.595*** -2.722*** 4.357 3.034 7.066 15.41** 19.90*** 12.92*** 
(0.895) (0.799) (0.585) (7.252) (7.805) (4.637) (6.033) (7.039) (4.188) 
DEBT_SEC -0.539*** -0.688*** -0.715*** -0.518*** -0.649*** -0.666*** 
(0.171) (0.216) (0.115) (0.156) (0.205) (0.123) 
STOCKS 0.0345 0.0201 0.0161 0.0396 0.0250 0.0198 0.0620** 0.0511* 0.0590*** 0.0727** 0.0692** 0.0666*** 
(0.0281) (0.0315) (0.0274) (0.0277) (0.0310) (0.0282) (0.0299) (0.0286) (0.0173) (0.0304) (0.0320) (0.0201) 
CREDIT2 -0.911 -0.792 -1.118** -1.858*** -2.393*** -1.616*** 
(0.859) (0.921) (0.511) (0.700) (0.821) (0.521) 
CREDIT-HSH -4.120*** -4.168*** -3.591*** -4.270*** -4.557*** -2.755*** 
(1.017) (0.942) (0.527) (0.874) (0.929) (0.948) 
CREDIT-NFC 0.910 1.051 0.300 0.880 1.014 0.583* 
(0.778) (0.847) (0.347) (0.686) (0.716) (0.322) 
DEBT_SEC-FCO -0.417* -0.338 -0.357** -0.297 -0.201 -0.293* 
(0.233) (0.221) (0.169) (0.200) (0.203) (0.166) 
DEBT_SEC-NFC -0.183 -0.214 -0.354*** -0.168 -0.209 -0.407*** 
(0.267) (0.282) (0.118) (0.244) (0.257) (0.127) 
INC -1.133 -3.579 -4.378 -4.054 -5.663 -5.957 -1.558 -2.870 -4.891 -5.979 -7.477 -6.516 
(8.882) (7.645) (7.264) (9.561) (9.295) (7.864) (8.253) (7.628) (6.326) (8.105) (7.514) (6.719) 
EDU 3.277*** 3.601*** 3.603*** 3.183*** 3.499*** 3.555*** 2.842*** 3.313*** 3.353*** 2.714*** 3.054*** 3.314*** 
(0.942) (1.180) (1.284) (0.942) (1.149) (1.270) (0.829) (1.076) (1.219) (0.821) (1.028) (1.190) 
GOV 6.157** 5.411** 6.313*** 5.060 4.729 5.767*** 6.972*** 6.553*** 7.045*** 5.407** 5.330** 6.109*** 
(2.896) (2.523) (1.398) (3.139) (3.112) (1.904) (2.545) (2.418) (0.916) (2.495) (2.582) (1.451) 
OPN -1.836 -2.038 -0.702 -1.665 -1.840 -0.554 -2.046 -2.121 -0.748 -1.764 -1.671 -0.636 
(1.460) (1.763) (1.935) (1.386) (1.758) (1.859) (1.485) (1.832) (1.885) (1.299) (1.556) (1.726) 
INF -7.024*** -8.057*** -13.88*** -6.587*** -7.620*** -13.12*** -6.831*** -7.960*** -13.67*** -6.108*** -6.611** -13.08*** 
(2.200) (2.643) (3.612) (1.947) (2.496) (3.493) (2.025) (2.630) (3.589) (1.873) (2.713) (3.119) 
Constant 0.0438 0.0811 0.0547 0.0938 0.119 0.0839 0.0993 0.0888 0.0903 0.180 0.191 0.120 
(0.131) (0.121) (0.0968) (0.149) (0.157) (0.119) (0.109) (0.114) (0.0701) (0.122) (0.128) (0.0945) 
Observations 267 195 150 267 195 150 260 188 143 260 188 143 
R-squared 0.438 0.505 0.564 0.487 0.533 0.580 0.469 0.512 0.579 0.544 0.582 0.601 
Number of countries 21 15 9 21 15 9 21 15 9 21 15 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Financial series are bold faced; 
Dependent variable: average GDP per capita growth rate over various periods ahead. The abbreviations of variables are explained in Table 1. 
Table B4. Robustness checks: reducing the number of variables (exclusion of period dummies). 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Related questions Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q6 Q6 Q6 
VARIABLES \ Group of cntrs.: OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 
                          
CREDIT -1.472** -1.533*** -1.515*** 11.09* 16.20 8.781***    13.93** 19.33*** 14.79*** 
 (0.594) (0.573) (0.542) (6.396) (9.930) (3.326)    (5.722) (7.458) (3.786) 
DEBT_SEC -0.227* -0.482*** -0.412*** -0.181** -0.259* -0.310***       
 (0.133) (0.133) (0.0956) (0.0857) (0.141) (0.111)       
STOCKS 0.0405 0.0352 0.0156 0.0422 0.0454 0.0164 0.0571* 0.0565** 0.0263** 0.0567* 0.0583** 0.0295* 
 (0.0337) (0.0228) (0.0152) (0.0298) (0.0303) (0.0180) (0.0346) (0.0255) (0.0130) (0.0305) (0.0257) (0.0163) 
CREDIT2    -1.491* -2.135* -1.195***    -1.706*** -2.381*** -1.801*** 
    (0.777) (1.205) (0.390)    (0.654) (0.852) (0.469) 
CREDIT-HSH       -1.662*** -1.480** -1.923*** -1.666** -1.544** -1.588** 
       (0.626) (0.664) (0.602) (0.647) (0.737) (0.689) 
CREDIT-NFC       0.865* 0.608 1.012* 0.604 0.252 1.095* 
       (0.462) (0.431) (0.611) (0.432) (0.609) (0.598) 
DEBT_SEC-FCO       -0.250 -0.309*** -0.285*** -0.0435 -0.00705 -0.109 
       (0.156) (0.116) (0.108) (0.114) (0.117) (0.0847) 
DEBT_SEC-NFC       -0.219 -0.255 -0.116 -0.210 -0.250 -0.154 
       (0.192) (0.201) (0.116) (0.179) (0.188) (0.116) 
INC -10.20* -14.04** -14.37 -17.42* -22.30** -17.49 -10.05** -13.14*** -13.05** -15.65*** -19.25*** -15.22** 
 (6.026) (5.607) (10.45) (9.106) (10.84) (10.90) (4.643) (4.462) (6.192) (5.923) (6.475) (6.860) 
Constant 0.700*** 0.628*** 0.521 0.419 0.278 0.384 0.791*** 0.702*** 0.618** 0.568*** 0.457** 0.523** 
 (0.232) (0.227) (0.473) (0.341) (0.453) (0.471) (0.214) (0.188) (0.269) (0.210) (0.232) (0.266) 
             
Observations 294 205 158 294 205 158 287 198 151 287 198 151 
R-squared 0.782 0.818 0.889 0.824 0.834 0.901 0.787 0.811 0.885 0.826 0.842 0.901 
Number of countries 22 16 10 22 16 10 22 16 10 22 16 10 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Financial series are bold faced; 
Dependent variable: average GDP per capita growth rate over various periods ahead. The abbreviations of variables are explained in Table 1. 
 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Related questions Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q6 Q6 Q6 
VARIABLES \ Group of cntrs.: OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 
                          
CREDIT -1.414*** -1.407** -1.328** 10.29* 15.42* 8.394**    13.19** 19.63*** 13.85*** 
 (0.544) (0.563) (0.549) (5.786) (8.931) (3.649)    (5.663) (7.408) (3.661) 
DEBT_SEC -0.234* -0.477*** -0.429*** -0.199** -0.271** -0.324**       
 (0.140) (0.136) (0.121) (0.0946) (0.129) (0.129)       
STOCKS 0.0480* 0.0531** 0.0296** 0.0593** 0.0656** 0.0311* 0.0542* 0.0648** 0.0227 0.0627** 0.0688** 0.0270 
 (0.0267) (0.0237) (0.0147) (0.0257) (0.0295) (0.0168) (0.0304) (0.0303) (0.0203) (0.0292) (0.0308) (0.0213) 
CREDIT2    -1.397* -2.039* -1.129***    -1.597** -2.386*** -1.632*** 
    (0.719) (1.107) (0.433)    (0.652) (0.869) (0.444) 
CREDIT-HSH       -1.711*** -1.430** -1.970*** -1.803*** -1.672** -1.975*** 
       (0.615) (0.657) (0.619) (0.655) (0.693) (0.626) 
CREDIT-NFC       0.921** 0.404 0.684 0.639 0.0646 0.864** 
       (0.457) (0.433) (0.472) (0.413) (0.588) (0.388) 
DEBT_SEC-FCO       -0.306* -0.311** -0.293** -0.106 -0.0206 -0.153 
       (0.176) (0.140) (0.116) (0.136) (0.135) (0.106) 
DEBT_SEC-NFC       -0.263 -0.285 -0.121 -0.246 -0.277 -0.151 
       (0.192) (0.204) (0.0961) (0.182) (0.193) (0.111) 
INC -10.60** -14.50*** -15.23*** -16.65** -21.60** -17.13*** -9.686** -13.49*** -13.61*** -15.02*** -19.56*** -15.38*** 
 (4.924) (4.915) (4.697) (7.493) (9.196) (6.055) (4.158) (3.914) (3.296) (5.494) (6.274) (4.390) 
PC 0.169 0.228 0.612*** -0.00659 0.122 0.577** 0.241 0.324 0.666*** 0.0835 0.203 0.621** 
 (0.315) (0.331) (0.223) (0.362) (0.445) (0.276) (0.278) (0.289) (0.209) (0.304) (0.369) (0.250) 
Constant 0.654*** 0.580*** 0.466** 0.428 0.304 0.391 0.795*** 0.663*** 0.590*** 0.585*** 0.438* 0.528*** 
 (0.183) (0.197) (0.207) (0.271) (0.366) (0.249) (0.197) (0.158) (0.166) (0.196) (0.230) (0.189) 
             
Observations 267 195 150 267 195 150 260 188 143 260 188 143 
R-squared 0.783 0.814 0.896 0.814 0.827 0.902 0.789 0.811 0.896 0.819 0.836 0.906 
Number of countries 21 15 9 21 15 9 21 15 9 21 15 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Financial series are bold faced; 
Dependent variable: average GDP per capita growth rate over various periods ahead. The abbreviations of variables are explained in Table 1. 
 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Related questions Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q6 Q6 Q6 
VARIABLES \ Group of cntrs.: OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 
                          
DEBT_SEC / CREDIT -0.204* -0.436*** -0.390*** -0.212** -0.305*** -0.284***       
 (0.110) (0.131) (0.133) (0.0957) (0.105) (0.102)       
STOCKS / CREDIT 0.0874** 0.0810** 0.0529** 0.0649* 0.0467 0.0307* 0.0796** 0.0775*** 0.0296 0.0708** 0.0611** 0.0274 
 (0.0402) (0.0344) (0.0208) (0.0334) (0.0308) (0.0162) (0.0345) (0.0295) (0.0235) (0.0316) (0.0285) (0.0212) 
CREDIT    9.562 13.42* 8.101*    13.90** 18.65*** 14.59*** 
    (5.979) (8.098) (4.259)    (5.568) (7.237) (4.981) 
CREDIT2    -1.340* -1.819* -1.097**    -1.792*** -2.416*** -1.786*** 
    (0.729) (0.995) (0.493)    (0.695) (0.921) (0.576) 
CREDIT-HSH / CREDIT-NFC       -0.930** -0.568 -1.055** -0.802* -0.300 -1.076** 
       (0.444) (0.537) (0.524) (0.457) (0.630) (0.419) 
DEBT_SEC-FCO / DEBT_SEC-NFC       0.123 0.129 -0.116 0.159 0.189 0.00620 
       (0.150) (0.144) (0.0923) (0.143) (0.142) (0.0579) 
INC -15.83*** -18.64*** -10.11* -15.29** -20.25** -9.414 -14.68*** -17.33*** -8.640 -18.10*** -22.27*** -10.65* 
 (5.022) (5.316) (5.967) (7.169) (7.949) (5.880) (4.927) (5.526) (5.256) (6.604) (7.466) (5.440) 
EDU -0.212 -0.316 0.00444 -0.178 -0.350 0.0381 -0.331 -0.289 -0.0887 -0.309 -0.387 -0.137 
 (0.464) (0.524) (0.644) (0.455) (0.541) (0.668) (0.429) (0.540) (0.540) (0.434) (0.547) (0.579) 
GOV -0.368 -1.813 3.514* -0.0744 -1.700 3.690** -0.0708 -1.218 3.515** -0.652 -1.796 3.083** 
 (1.686) (2.965) (1.946) (2.044) (3.192) (1.812) (1.557) (2.652) (1.386) (1.846) (2.593) (1.226) 
OPN 0.0984 0.747 3.146*** -0.283 0.182 2.707*** 0.121 0.936 2.997*** -0.209 0.186 2.367*** 
 (0.689) (1.012) (0.917) (0.658) (1.055) (0.844) (0.612) (0.940) (0.622) (0.491) (0.868) (0.610) 
INF -2.909* -0.614 -4.416 -2.964 -0.703 -5.525* -2.907 -0.178 -4.318 -2.749 -0.0219 -4.273 
 (1.718) (2.352) (2.989) (1.915) (2.884) (3.347) (2.083) (2.907) (3.191) (2.542) (4.010) (3.092) 
Constant 0.354** 0.566*** 0.692** 0.366** 0.479* 0.652** 0.383** 0.524** 0.696** 0.304* 0.355 0.609** 
 (0.156) (0.217) (0.314) (0.155) (0.256) (0.287) (0.161) (0.216) (0.319) (0.170) (0.267) (0.284) 
             
Observations 267 195 150 267 195 150 260 188 143 260 188 143 
R-squared 0.797 0.809 0.886 0.813 0.831 0.894 0.796 0.802 0.885 0.819 0.830 0.900 
Number of countries 21 15 9 21 15 9 21 15 9 21 15 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Financial series are bold faced; 
Dependent variable: average GDP per capita growth rate over various periods ahead. The abbreviations of variables are explained in Table 1. 
Table B7. Robustness checks: the usage of ratios to reduce the number of parameters under estimation. The respective ratios are represented using 
the notation A / B. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Related questions Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q6 Q6 Q6 
VARIABLES \ Group of cntrs.: OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 
CREDIT -1.509** -1.453** -1.387** 9.168* 16.95** 8.108*    18.22*** 25.77*** 13.77** 
 (0.635) (0.656) (0.609) (4.975) (7.313) (4.366)    (4.924) (5.822) (5.684) 
DEBT_SEC -0.621*** -0.630*** -0.377*** -0.490** -0.425*** -0.219**       
 (0.224) (0.183) (0.117) (0.211) (0.132) (0.103)       
STOCKS -0.0343 -0.0159 0.0731 -0.0213 -0.00968 0.0716 -0.00574 -0.00385 0.0365 0.0133 -0.00176 0.0421 
 (0.117) (0.105) (0.0806) (0.0942) (0.0819) (0.0748) (0.103) (0.0941) (0.0961) (0.0781) (0.0748) (0.0833) 
CREDIT2    -1.256** -2.176** -1.098**    -2.132*** -3.019*** -1.611** 
    (0.603) (0.901) (0.490)    (0.574) (0.675) (0.667) 
CREDIT-HSH       -2.506*** -2.180*** -2.189*** -2.712*** -2.785*** -2.350*** 
       (0.770) (0.637) (0.704) (0.723) (0.652) (0.816) 
CREDIT-NFC       1.877** 1.520 0.858 1.453** 0.914 0.911 
       (0.850) (0.930) (1.063) (0.668) (0.593) (0.803) 
DEBT_SEC-FCO       -0.284 -0.205 -0.228 0.0125 0.268 0.0321 
       (0.258) (0.251) (0.190) (0.192) (0.195) (0.193) 
DEBT_SEC-NFC       -0.661** -0.680** -0.126 -0.660** -0.714** -0.211 
       (0.328) (0.329) (0.193) (0.300) (0.288) (0.191) 
INC -10.14** -13.91*** -10.16** -14.92** -21.61*** -11.83*** -7.656* -10.90*** -11.94*** -14.67*** -19.73*** -13.99*** 
 (4.705) (3.743) (4.074) (6.224) (5.798) (4.561) (4.211) (2.898) (4.382) (4.667) (4.773) (4.765) 
EDU -0.0444 0.0185 0.0684 -0.0428 -0.222 -0.0328 -0.139 0.0506 0.0676 -0.133 -0.298 -0.141 
 (0.437) (0.552) (0.661) (0.472) (0.596) (0.667) (0.426) (0.541) (0.671) (0.463) (0.635) (0.673) 
GOV 0.177 -0.777 3.555* -0.686 -2.285 3.048* 0.601 -0.514 3.224** -0.343 -1.090 2.865** 
 (1.556) (2.409) (1.824) (1.849) (2.701) (1.722) (1.290) (1.959) (1.479) (1.326) (1.855) (1.455) 
OPN -0.176 0.950 2.846*** -0.219 0.367 2.601*** -0.270 1.089 2.669*** -0.364 0.350 2.194*** 
 (0.913) (1.258) (0.914) (0.763) (0.968) (0.855) (0.840) (1.295) (0.761) (0.660) (0.993) (0.791) 
INF -4.779** -3.607** -5.695* -4.939*** -4.259** -4.845 -5.493*** -2.479 -5.995** -5.438*** -2.163 -4.330 
 (1.869) (1.647) (3.382) (1.536) (1.752) (3.466) (1.847) (1.727) (2.896) (1.662) (2.238) (3.253) 
CREDIT 0.786 1.239* 0.857** 0.670 0.590 0.673       
 (0.606) (0.677) (0.415) (0.540) (0.514) (0.410)       
DEBT_SEC 0.0858 0.274 0.118 0.0830 0.200 0.00191       
 (0.138) (0.178) (0.162) (0.131) (0.134) (0.162)       
STOCKS 0.0409 0.0149 -0.0393 0.0347 0.0175 -0.0348 0.0325 0.0258 -0.0229 0.0265 0.0294 -0.0235 
 (0.0698) (0.0540) (0.0544) (0.0569) (0.0421) (0.0511) (0.0602) (0.0512) (0.0607) (0.0439) (0.0374) (0.0523) 
CREDIT-HSH       1.399 2.276*** 2.418** 1.278* 1.468** 2.122* 
       (0.883) (0.847) (1.084) (0.730) (0.641) (1.164) 
CREDIT-NFC       -0.366 -0.492 -0.299 -0.304 -0.391 -0.242 
       (0.574) (0.605) (0.695) (0.400) (0.348) (0.576) 
DEBT_SEC-FCO       0.0915 -0.0203 -0.00479 -0.000550 -0.224* -0.173 
       (0.185) (0.205) (0.201) (0.142) (0.123) (0.171) 
DEBT_SEC-NFC       0.215 0.220 -0.0377 0.237 0.258 0.0353 
       (0.212) (0.221) (0.124) (0.196) (0.195) (0.125) 
Constant 0.544*** 0.723*** 0.659*** 0.411*** 0.418** 0.617** 0.614*** 0.879*** 0.562*** 0.412*** 0.495** 0.499** 
 (0.182) (0.256) (0.247) (0.133) (0.200) (0.246) (0.195) (0.261) (0.210) (0.105) (0.227) (0.211) 
             
Observations 251 182 143 251 182 143 244 175 136 244 175 136 
R-squared 0.808 0.837 0.897 0.833 0.859 0.904 0.813 0.847 0.908 0.857 0.887 0.916 
Number of countries 21 15 9 21 15 9 21 15 9 21 15 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Financial series are bold faced;. Dependent variable: average GDP per capita growth rate over various periods ahead. The abbreviations of variables are explained in Table 1 






  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Related questions Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q6 Q6 Q6 
VARIABLES \ Group of 
cntrs.: OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 
                          
CREDIT -0.987* -0.553 -0.646 -2.287 1.916 6.538**    3.328 7.063 11.16*** 
 (0.506) (0.389) (0.547) (6.184) (5.707) (3.173)    (6.987) (7.907) (3.874) 
DEBT_SEC -0.355*** -0.384** -0.321*** -0.362*** -0.357** -0.244***       
 (0.133) (0.161) (0.0806) (0.138) (0.162) (0.0741)       
STOCKS 0.0540 0.0608** 0.0432** 0.0536 0.0610** 0.0424** 0.0504 0.0729* 0.0482** 0.0510 0.0728** 0.0488** 
 (0.0407) (0.0307) (0.0194) (0.0402) (0.0299) (0.0193) (0.0429) (0.0374) (0.0220) (0.0423) (0.0363) (0.0238) 
CREDIT2    0.155 -0.298 -0.834**    -0.352 -0.822 -1.304*** 
    (0.698) (0.671) (0.374)    (0.802) (0.891) (0.450) 
CREDIT-HSH       -2.072*** -1.141*** -1.051 -2.299*** -1.383** -1.195* 
       (0.720) (0.333) (0.650) (0.830) (0.662) (0.675) 
CREDIT-NFC       1.817*** 1.168** 0.902** 1.672*** 0.992*** 1.029*** 
       (0.563) (0.501) (0.401) (0.514) (0.380) (0.359) 
DEBT_SEC-FCO       -0.167 -0.157 -0.269*** -0.132 -0.0720 -0.160** 
       (0.177) (0.131) (0.0937) (0.182) (0.133) (0.0808) 
DEBT_SEC-NFC       -0.160 -0.185 -0.106 -0.160 -0.188 -0.128 
       (0.135) (0.142) (0.103) (0.132) (0.140) (0.107) 
INC 2.535 -2.799 -1.771 3.423 -4.068 -3.548 4.227 -0.807 -1.930 2.410 -3.867 -4.627 
 (4.718) (2.129) (3.670) (7.054) (4.248) (4.789) (4.630) (1.692) (3.928) (7.174) (4.304) (4.977) 
EDU 0.114 0.103 0.237 0.123 0.0669 0.174 -0.127 0.0546 0.112 -0.122 -0.00579 0.0127 
 (0.508) (0.585) (0.710) (0.502) (0.578) (0.708) (0.472) (0.542) (0.603) (0.467) (0.546) (0.607) 
GOV 3.588** 4.136*** 5.774*** 3.782** 3.831** 5.281*** 3.711*** 4.671*** 5.510*** 3.448** 4.165*** 4.818*** 
 (1.457) (1.534) (1.702) (1.899) (1.823) (1.682) (1.378) (1.369) (1.377) (1.695) (1.522) (1.348) 
OPN -0.747 -0.0220 1.308 -0.745 -0.0953 1.125 -0.718 0.00329 0.909 -0.710 -0.159 0.613 
 (0.809) (0.845) (1.245) (0.826) (0.710) (1.152) (0.711) (0.984) (1.243) (0.680) (0.836) (1.145) 
INF -2.028 0.785 -4.560 -2.048 0.838 -3.884 -1.915 1.100 -3.481 -1.776 1.429 -2.668 
 (2.254) (2.111) (4.366) (2.300) (2.145) (4.379) (2.027) (2.290) (4.042) (1.993) (2.404) (4.178) 
Lagged LHS 0.499*** 0.600*** 0.386 0.507*** 0.593*** 0.382 0.565*** 0.648*** 0.425 0.553*** 0.624*** 0.405 
 (0.121) (0.108) (0.248) (0.126) (0.115) (0.252) (0.0930) (0.105) (0.277) (0.111) (0.119) (0.279) 
Constant 0.741*** 0.854*** 0.688** 0.759*** 0.817*** 0.648** 0.861*** 0.895*** 0.700*** 0.824*** 0.806*** 0.632*** 
 (0.227) (0.236) (0.272) (0.225) (0.193) (0.269) (0.220) (0.220) (0.263) (0.216) (0.186) (0.245) 
             
Observations 267 195 150 267 195 150 260 188 143 260 188 143 
R-squared 0.763 0.836 0.880 0.755 0.843 0.890 0.762 0.827 0.884 0.778 0.844 0.899 
Number of countries 21 15 9 21 15 9 21 15 9 21 15 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Financial series are bold faced; 
Dependent variable: average GDP per capita growth rate over various periods ahead. The abbreviations of variables are explained in Table 1. 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Related questions Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1-Q2 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4-Q5 Q6 Q6 Q6 
VARIABLES \ Group of cntrs.: OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 OECD EU EMU1999 
CREDIT -1.098* -1.210* -0.921 6.359 9.048* 8.016 8.136 13.10** 13.70** 
(0.635) (0.678) (0.616) (5.571) (4.875) (5.368) (5.459) (5.135) (6.789) 
DEBT_SEC -0.313 -0.296** -0.448*** -0.242 -0.191* -0.327*** 
(0.200) (0.135) (0.0798) (0.175) (0.114) (0.0992) 
STOCKS 0.0330 0.0144 0.0571** 0.0385 0.0188 0.0530** 0.0293 0.00475 0.0444 0.0378 0.0129 0.0403 
(0.0553) (0.0518) (0.0290) (0.0502) (0.0454) (0.0249) (0.0486) (0.0568) (0.0346) (0.0415) (0.0450) (0.0253) 
CREDIT2 -0.865 -1.195** -1.046 -0.972 -1.533** -1.591** 
(0.671) (0.586) (0.640) (0.673) (0.616) (0.809) 
CREDIT-HSH -1.922*** -2.003** -1.743** -1.754** -2.112** -2.088** 
(0.678) (0.824) (0.882) (0.841) (0.837) (0.953) 
CREDIT-NFC 0.620*** 0.459* 0.265 0.713** 0.661** 0.597* 
(0.237) (0.268) (0.337) (0.289) (0.287) (0.340) 
DEBT_SEC-FCO -0.312 -0.256* -0.247** -0.244 -0.126 -0.0903 
(0.201) (0.145) (0.0995) (0.154) (0.0948) (0.0661) 
DEBT_SEC-NFC 0.0540 0.0111 -0.0550 0.0424 -0.0209 -0.142 
(0.108) (0.115) (0.177) (0.109) (0.108) (0.208) 
INC -5.714 -10.82** -8.970* -7.165 -13.00** -10.33* -8.146 -11.82*** -7.965* -9.440 -14.37*** -9.935** 
(6.780) (4.479) (4.863) (7.095) (5.489) (5.568) (5.032) (4.079) (4.253) (5.790) (4.879) (4.670) 
EDU 0.0164 -0.0562 0.0373 -0.00823 -0.112 -0.0234 -0.149 -0.220 -0.0101 -0.174 -0.297 -0.119 
(0.397) (0.528) (0.569) (0.405) (0.543) (0.572) (0.340) (0.507) (0.535) (0.348) (0.514) (0.538) 
GOV 2.257** 2.404** 3.476** 1.937* 1.892 3.126** 2.352** 2.532* 4.127*** 1.949* 1.835 3.485** 
(1.011) (1.148) (1.379) (1.058) (1.451) (1.491) (1.009) (1.467) (1.565) (1.061) (1.611) (1.441) 
OPN -0.723 0.831 2.409*** -0.720 0.712 2.268*** -0.660 0.609 2.372*** -0.684 0.413 2.004*** 
(0.848) (0.979) (0.507) (0.817) (0.927) (0.574) (0.667) (1.130) (0.465) (0.662) (1.019) (0.455) 
INF -4.722** -2.841 -4.904*** -4.851** -2.296 -4.003* -4.670** -2.128 -4.591** -4.906** -1.300 -3.269 
(2.351) (2.709) (1.875) (2.236) (2.625) (2.254) (2.133) (2.263) (1.850) (2.032) (2.009) (2.088) 
D_HOUS -1.085*** -0.865*** -0.517*** -1.039*** -0.779*** -0.490*** -0.977*** -0.753*** -0.527*** -0.939*** -0.638*** -0.471*** 
(0.331) (0.289) (0.142) (0.322) (0.288) (0.144) (0.261) (0.209) (0.143) (0.269) (0.206) (0.123) 
STOCKS * D_HOUS 0.213*** 0.182** 0.0769*** 0.204*** 0.164** 0.0744*** 0.190*** 0.147*** 0.0729** 0.183*** 0.122** 0.0649** 
(0.0714) (0.0709) (0.0240) (0.0690) (0.0703) (0.0236) (0.0558) (0.0478) (0.0323) (0.0568) (0.0476) (0.0272) 
Constant 0.276 0.393 0.608** 0.251 0.343 0.583** 0.264 0.399 0.657** 0.240* 0.353 0.636*** 
(0.199) (0.256) (0.280) (0.175) (0.226) (0.266) (0.169) (0.279) (0.273) (0.140) (0.236) (0.232) 
Observations 211 142 118 211 142 118 210 141 117 210 141 117 
R-squared 0.816 0.871 0.895 0.829 0.883 0.901 0.842 0.882 0.895 0.851 0.895 0.906 
Number of countries 15 10 8 15 10 8 15 10 8 15 10 8 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Financial series are bold faced; 
Dependent variable: average GDP per capita growth rate over various periods ahead. The abbreviations of variables are explained in Table 1. 
Table B10. Robustness checks: including dummy series for acceleration of housing prices (D_HOUS). 
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